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 Non-technical summary 
The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical backbone to the debate about the 
macroeconomic effects of large upward exchange rate adjustments of tightly managed or 
pegged exchange rate regimes. Using a large cross-country dataset covering almost 50 
years of international economic history between 1960 and 2008, we study the empirical 
record of large exchange rate appreciation and revaluation shocks. Our goal is to provide 
systematic evidence on the macroeconomic lessons that can be learned from these 
episodes. 
Our approach is the following: in a first step, we identify large exchange rate 
appreciations and revaluations. Our definition of a large exchange rate event comprises a 
10 percent (or larger) appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate over a two-year 
window (or less), leading to sustained real effective appreciation. We hence limit 
ourselves to studying such nominal exchange rate appreciations that have led to large 
movements in real exchange rates. We require the appreciation to be sustained in real 
terms over at least five years. From 1960, we identify 25 episodes of large nominal and 
real appreciations in a sample of 128 countries of developing and advanced economies. 
Having identified these events, we ask in a second step how these affected the current 
account balance and output using a dummy variable augmented autoregressive panel 
model. We also split our sample and look at differences between advanced and 
developing countries in response to nominal and real appreciation shocks.  
We establish four central empirical regularities. First, the current account balance 
typically deteriorates strongly in response to appreciation and revaluation shocks. Three 
years after the strengthening of the exchange rate, the current account balance falls by 
about three percentage points of GDP as a function of decreased savings with stable 
investment rates. Second, the effects on output are limited. The negative effect on the 
level of output amounts to a modest 1 percent after six years. The confidence intervals are 
wide and the results are statistically insignificant. Third, while aggregate output is not 
strongly affected, export growth falls significantly after appreciation and revaluation 
shocks. Finally, most of these effects seem to be more pronounced in developing 
countries.  
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die globalen Ungleichgewichte in den Leistungsbilanzen werden häufig als Bedrohung 
für die weltwirtschaftliche Stabilität angesehen. Ausgehend davon wird argumentiert, 
dass die Überschussländer wie China deshalb ihre Währung aufwerten sollen, um diese 
stabilitätsgefährdenden Ungleichgewichte abzubauen. Die Studie trägt zu dieser Debatte 
bei, indem sie untersucht, welche Auswirkungen ausgeprägte und dauerhafte nominale 
und reale Wechselkursaufwertungen auf die Leistungsbilanz und weitere 
makroökonomische Schlüsselgrößen wie Wirtschaftswachstum, Investitionen und 
Ersparnisse sowie den Außenhandel haben. 
Das Vorgehen ist wie folgt. In einem ersten Schritt werden historische Episoden 
starker Aufwertungen in einem 128 Länder umfassenden Querschnitt mit Beobachtungen 
über die Jahre 1960 bis 2008 anhand folgender Kriterien definiert: Sowohl der nominale 
als auch reale effektive Wechselkurs eines Landes werten um mindestens 10 Prozent auf 
und die reale Aufwertung hatte mindestens fünf Jahre Bestand. Entsprechend dieser 
Kriterien können insgesamt 25 Episoden in dem vorliegenden Datensatz identifiziert 
werden. In einem nächsten Schritt wird untersucht, welche Auswirkungen der Eintritt in 
eine Episode ausgeprägter Wechselkursänderungen auf die Leistungsbilanz, das BIP-
Wachstum, die Ersparnisse, die Investitionen, die Exporte und die Importe ausübt. Zu 
diesem Zweck schätzt die Studie ein dynamisches Panel-Modell, das um Impulsdummies 
erweitert wird. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass signifikante makroökonomische Reaktionen mit 
starken Währungsaufwertungen verbunden sind. Die Leistungsbilanz fällt signifikant und 
der negative Effekt der Währungsaufwertung entfaltet nach drei Jahren seine stärkste 
Wirkung. Die Ersparnisse geben deutlich und lang anhaltend nach, während die 
Investitionen zunächst steigen, der Währungseffekt aber schnell ausläuft. Die 
Outputreaktion ist zunächst positiv und verläuft anschließend insignifikant. Die Exporte 
reagieren mit ihrem Einbruch wie zu erwarten und die Importe insignifikant. Eine 
Trennung der Beobachtungen nach dem Status des Pro-Kopf-Einkommens zeigt, dass die 
Effekte in Entwicklungsländern stärker und signifikanter sind als in entwickelten 
Ländern. 
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– Abstract  – 
 
In this paper we study the macroeconomic effects of large exchange rate appreciations. 
Using a sample of 128 countries from 1960-2008, we identify large nominal and real 
appreciations shocks and study their macroeconomic effects in a dummy-augmented 
panel autoregressive model. Our results show that an exchange rate appreciation can have 
strong effects on current account balances. Within three years after the appreciation 
event, the current account balance on average deteriorates by three percentage points of 
GDP. This effect occurs through a reduction of savings without a meaningful reduction in 
investment. Real export growth slows down substantially, while imports remain by and 
large unaffected. The output costs of appreciation are small and not statistically 
significant, indicating a shift towards domestic sources of growth. All these effects 
appear somewhat more pronounced in developing countries.  
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The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical backbone to the debate about the 
macroeconomic effects of large upward exchange rate adjustments of tightly managed or 
pegged exchange rate regimes. Using a large cross-country dataset covering almost 50 
years of international economic history between 1960 and 2008, we study the empirical 
record of large exchange rate appreciation and revaluation shocks. Some of these 
episodes are regularly referred to in the debate about global rebalancing in the wake of 
the recent financial crisis, e.g. in Germany and in Japan. Our goal is to provide systematic 
evidence on the macroeconomic lessons that can be learned from these episodes. 
Global imbalances have become a household word. In particular, the large trade 
imbalance between China and the United States has gained prominence in academic and 
political debates. Despite considerable disagreement about the causes, many economists 
think that the international imbalances that have developed in the past decade are 
problematic and should be reduced (e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff 2005; Cline and 
Williamson 2007; Feldstein 2008). However the appropriate policy treatment remains 
debated.1 One group of economists thinks that large exchange rate adjustments – 
basically a dollar depreciation and an appreciation of the Chinese renminbi and of other 
Asian currencies – will eventually play a role in rebalancing the world economy 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff 2005; Goldstein, 2006; Wolf 2009; Subramanian 2010; Ferguson 
and Schularick 2011).  
Yet other scholars argue that currency adjustment is not an effective policy tool as 
elasticities could be relatively low and underlying savings and investment remain 
unaffected by exchange rate changes (Devereux and Genberg 2007; McKinnon 2007; 
Qiao 2007). A third group of development economists, by contrast, fears that exchange 
rate adjustment might be all too effective – but mainly in reducing the growth rate of the 
Chinese and other developing economies as China has become a locomotive for 
developing country growth in the 2000s (Rodrik 2008; Berg and Miao 2010; Garroway et 
al. 2010).2  
                                                 
1 There is also an emerging consensus that the imbalances were closely linked to the financial crisis of 2008-
09 (Bini Smaghi 2008; Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2009; Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 2009; Obstfeld and 
Rogoff 2009). However, some authors maintain that the financial crisis of 2008-09 was by and large unrelated 
to global imbalances (e.g. Dooley et al. 2009).   
2 The key argument is that revaluation might put a successful export-led growth model at risk that was 
centred on a competitive real exchange rate and positive externalities from investment in the tradable goods 
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The main points of disagreement about the effects of exchange rate changes on 
the macroeconomy relate to two central issues. First, how effective would currency 
revaluation be in reducing current account surpluses in Asia and deficits in the United 
States? Second, is there reason to believe that appreciation would come with the negative 
side effect of reducing growth in developing countries? The first question relates to the 
role of exchange rates in international adjustment and the second to the role of real 
exchange valuation in the development process. While these questions open up two very 
different theoretical boxes, they are to some degree open to a joint empirical treatment, 
which is what we aim to do in this paper.  
Despite the large literature dealing with exchange rates and trade elasticities, the 
number of studies that have specifically analyzed the economic effects of appreciation 
episodes is relatively small3. Goldfajn and Valdés (1999) have studied large real effective 
appreciation episodes from 1960 to 1994 for a broad country sample, but with a focus on 
the dynamics of appreciation and overvaluation. Eichengreen and Hatase (2007) have 
analyzed the Japanese revaluation experience with an eye on the policy lessons for China 
today. A recent study by Eichengreen and Rose (2010) has broadened this approach and 
is similar to our study in its research objective, but not in the empirical approach.  
Our approach is the following: in a first step, we identify large exchange rate 
appreciations and revaluations. Our definition of a large exchange rate event comprises a 
10 percent (or larger) appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate over a two-year 
window (or less), leading to sustained real effective appreciation. We hence limit 
ourselves to studying such nominal exchange rate appreciations that have led to large 
movements in real exchange rates. We require the appreciation to be sustained in real 
terms over at least five years.  
From 1960, we identify 25 episodes of large nominal and real appreciations in a 
sample of 128 countries of developing and advanced economies. Having identified these 
events, we ask in a second step how these affected the current account balance and output 
using a dummy variable augmented autoregressive panel model following the 
                                                                                                                                                 
sector. For a formal model see Korinek and Servén (2010). Similar causes have been named as an 
explanation for the widespread phenomenon of “fear of floating” among emerging market countries (Calvo 
and Reinhart, 2002). 
3 At least outside the narrower context of appreciation pressures in resource rich economies. The seminal 
contribution on the so-called Dutch disease is Corden and Neary (1982).   
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methodology pioneered in Cerra and Saxena (2008). We also split our sample and look at 
differences between advanced and developing countries in response to nominal and real 
appreciation shocks.  
We establish four central empirical regularities. First, the current account balance 
typically deteriorates strongly in response to appreciation and revaluation shocks. Three 
years after the strengthening of the exchange rate, the current account balance falls by 
about three percentage points of GDP as a function of decreased savings with stable 
investment rates. Second, the effects on output are limited. The negative effect on the 
level of output amounts to a modest 1 percent after six years. The confidence intervals are 
wide and the results are statistically insignificant. Third, while aggregate output is not 
strongly affected, export growth falls significantly after appreciation and revaluation 
shocks. Finally, most of these effects seem to be more pronounced in developing 
countries.  
Difficulties in disentangling the effects of exchange rate changes from the factors 
that lead to the change of the exchange rate have been a typical problem for empirical 
analysis in this field (Engel 2009). In this paper, we deal with the exogeneity issue 
through detailed narrative documentation of the individual appreciation episodes4 and 
explicit exogeneity tests. This allows us to differentiate between appreciation episodes 
that occurred for largely exogenous reasons, and those that might have been partly 
endogenous to economic development. We identify 14 episodes when a country's real and 
nominal effective exchange rate appreciated by 10 percent or more without discretionary 
adjustments of the parity by the country's government. Typically, such appreciations were 
the indirect consequence of the appreciation of the anchor currency of the peg against 
important other currencies.5 We use the estimated effects of these events to evaluate the 
robustness of estimations using a broader definition of appreciation episodes. 
                                                 
4 Not dissimilar to the approach taken by Romer and Romer (2010) to identify the effect of tax changes. 
5 To give an example, the Malaysian ringgit was managed relative to the Singapore Dollar in the late 1970s. 
When the Singapore Dollar strengthened against the US dollar in the early 1980s, the Malaysian ringit 
appreciated strongly on a trade weighted basis (both in nominal and real terms) for reasons that were by 
and large unrelated to Malaysia's economic position. We consider this an exogenous appreciation event. By 
contrast, when the German government decided to revalue the Deutschmark in 1970, it is likely that the 
decision partly reflected the strength of the German economy and the strength of the external position. We 
consequently treat such an event as at least partly endogenous.  
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 provides a theoretical and 
empirical introduction. In section 2, we define and describe the appreciation events we 
are studying. Section 3 introduces our econometric methodology; section 4 presents the 
key results and a number of robustness tests. Section 5 summarises the key results of this 
study – strong effects on current account balances, a small and insignificant negative 
impact on output but pronounced effects on export growth, and somewhat stronger 
overall responses in developing countries – and discusses their implication for economic 
policy. 
 
 
1. Real Effects of Large Exchange Rate Adjustments 
 
In the debate about the real effects of large exchange rate adjustments, two 
different strands of international economics meet. First, the debate opens up old fault 
lines in international economics about the effects of exchange rate adjustments on current 
account balances. Some scholars are more pessimistic about elasticities, pass-through or 
effects on savings and investment, while others are more optimistic. Second, these long-
standing disagreements are amplified by concerns coming mainly of development 
economics with regard to the positive growth effects of undervaluation (and the potential 
costs of undoing it). We shall discuss both in turn. 
In its simplest form, the idea that large exchange rate movements affect trade and 
current account balances and could help the global rebalancing process goes back to 
traditional elasticity models. In this framework, changes in real exchange rates will affect 
the current account if the Marshall-Lerner condition is fulfilled, i.e. if the sum of export 
and import elasticities exceeds one.6 However, "elasticity pessimism" has a long tradition 
in international economics.7 Many empirical studies found relatively low elasticities, at 
least at short-time horizons (Rose and Yellen 1989; Hooper et al. 2000; Chinn 2004; 
Chinn and Lee 2009). Also the literature in the field of new open economy models has 
often pointed to limited short-run responsiveness of the current account to exchange rate 
                                                 
6 Initially, there might be a J-Curve effect due to counteracting valuation effects, but eventually the current 
account would deteriorate as price elasticities rise over time. 
7 See the discussion in Obstfeld (2002). 
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changes (Goldberg and Knetter 1997; Devereux and Engel 2003).8 All in all, skepticism 
with regard to the role of exchange rates in generating adjustment is widespread and no 
consensus has been reached to date (Engel 2009).9 Models incorporating low elasticities, 
limited pass-through, and imports of intermediate goods yield only small adjustment 
effects (Devereux and Genberg 2007).  
It does not come as a surprise that the same lack of consensus can be found in the 
literature debating the Chinese case. Devereux and Genberg (2007) develop a general 
equilibrium model to analyze the impact of an exchange rate appreciation on the current 
account that generates only small effects. Also Kwack et al. (2007), Marquez and 
Schindler (2007), Cheung et al. (2010), Thorbecke and Smith (2010) have studied 
Chinese trade elasticities. However, while this literature has generally arrived at 
relatively small effects from possible Renminbi revaluation, other recent contributions by 
Ahmed (2009) and Cline (2010) have found export price elasticities closer to unity and 
see greater potential for exchange rate adjustment. 
As a country’s current account balance equals the gap between national saving 
and investment, real exchange rate movements ultimately have to impact savings and 
investment patterns to be effective in changing the current account. Yet to what extent 
changes in real exchange rates affect savings and investment remains an open issue. 
Other factors such as income, growth expectations and demographic trends are likely to 
play an important role for savings and investment decisions, but exchange rates might 
also matter. Economic historians have often seen real exchange rate undervaluation as 
important factors in explaining growth performance. Eichengreen (2008) as well as 
Ferguson and Schularick (2011) argue that real exchange rate undervaluation has often 
been a cornerstone of successful catching-up, partly through the effect on corporate 
profitability and investment.  
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007) argue that a more depreciated exchange 
rate leads to lower real wages, inducing firms to increase saving, thereby rising overall 
                                                 
8 Chinn and Wei (2008) demonstrate that flexible exchange rate regimes are no more effective in facilitating 
current account adjustment than fixed regimes. 
9 However, some authors take the opposite position and argue that the "elasticity pessimism" might have gone 
too far (Obstfeld 2002). In the Asian context, models that show only small adjustment effects (at best) due to 
sticky prices are also at odds with the rich literature on particularly high pass-through in emerging markets 
leading to the "fear of floating" phenomenon (Calvo and Reinhart 2002). 
  
6
saving. Gala (2008) explores the link between depreciated exchange rate changes, 
depressed real wages and high corporate savings in Asian economies. Similar channels 
have been analysed by Montiel (2000) and Montiel and Servén (2008). Qiao (2007), by 
contrast, studies the effect of appreciation on investment. Her model predicts that 
investment will be dampened by appreciation and thereby possibly causing the current 
account to improve as appreciation exerts a negative wealth effect. But related empirical 
evidence remains relatively scarce.10 These disagreements clearly call for a targeted 
research strategy. If we want to understand how exchange rate changes affect investments 
and savings determinants, we need to study the impact of exchange rate changes not only 
on the current account balance, but on savings and investment separately.  
The impact of exchange rate changes on economic growth is another field that has 
attracted considerable attention in the literature. A large empirical literature deals with 
the growth effects of depreciation events (Edward 1986; Hong and Tornell 2005; Gupta 
et al. 2007). Bussière et al. (2010) have recently provided new evidence on the output 
effects of currency collapses that is methodologically similar to ours.  However, the role 
of exchange rate policy and its effects on growth has also been the subject of a more 
fundamental debate among development economists. At the core of the debate is the 
question whether the view needs modification that any departures of the real exchange 
rate from its equilibrium level would harm growth by distorting a key relative price in the 
economy.11 A key implication of this traditional "misalignment view" was that 
undervaluation is equally harmful as overvaluation.  
Recent contributions argue that a depreciated real exchange rate can be 
economically beneficial as it promotes economic growth through technology transfers 
and learning-by-doing externalities (Eichengreen 2008; Aizenman and Lee 2008). The 
literature on export-led growth has repeatedly stressed that such ideas are influential for 
development strategies in large parts of Asia (Dooley et al. 2003). Korinek and Serven 
(2010) present a model in which real exchange rate valuation improves welfare via 
                                                 
10 Campa and Goldberg (1995, 1999) study the linkage between exchange rate and investment in industry in 
the US, Canada, UK and Japan. They find that during the 1970s appreciation generated a reduction in capital 
goods orders, but that the opposite pattern prevailed during the 1980s. Over a sample of Italian manufacturing 
firms, Nucci and Pozzolo (2001) show that a depreciation of the exchange rate can have positive effects on 
investment through higher revenues and a negative effect through the cost channel, but the magnitude of these 
effects varying significantly over time. 
11 For a useful survey see Eichengreen (2008). 
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positive externalities stemming from investment in the tradables sector. Through real 
exchange rate undervaluation, the government effectively subsidizes investment in the 
tradables sector. But by using the exchange rate as a tool, the government outsources the 
targeting of the subsidy to foreign consumers avoiding domestic rent-seeking and other 
political economy complications. On the empirical side, Rodrik (2008) presents panel 
regressions that show a correlation of growth rates in developing countries with a 
measure of real exchange rate undervaluation. A recent study by Berg and Miao (2010) 
essentially confirmed Rodrik’s analysis. The authors find empirical evidence that 
currency overvaluations are negative for growth while undervaluations are positively 
correlated with growth in developing-countries. Undoing real undervaluation could then 
be expected to be harmful to economic growth. 
Summing up, there is considerable uncertainty about the real economic effects of 
exchange rate changes. In the remainder of the paper, we want to subject these various 
positions to an empirical test: we first identify large appreciation shocks in the 1960-2008 
period for a broad country sample. We will then move on to estimate the macroeconomic 
effects on the current account balance, saving, investment and on overall economic 
growth.  
 
 
2. Identifying appreciation episodes 
 
Our sample consists of annual data for 128 advanced and developing countries for 
the period 1960-2008. We code an appreciation event for country (i) in year (t) when the 
following conditions are met. First, we define an appreciation event if the nominal 
effective exchange rate is revalued by at least 10 percent or more relative to the average 
level two years before. The two-year horizon allows us to capture not only one-time step 
revaluations, but also a number of smaller appreciation steps that happen within a short 
time window. We restrict our analysis to countries that operate fixed exchange rate 
regimes, i.e. pegs and managed floats, according to the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
classification (with a few minor modifications detailed in the appendix) as we expect 
appreciation episodes under floating regimes to be endogenous to economic 
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fundamentals. We define an appreciation event when the nominal effective exchange rate 
appreciates by 10 percent, so that 
 
(1) , , 2ln( ) ln( ) 0.1i t i tNEER NEER    . 
 
Second, the nominal appreciation must lead to sustained real appreciation. We 
therefore require that the real effective exchange rate remains stronger by 10 percent (or 
more) on average for three years relative to the beginning of the appreciation process, 
 
(2) , 1 , 2 , 3 , 2ln(( ) / 3) ln( ) 0.1i t i t i t i tREER REER REER REER       . 
 
We also ensure that the appreciation was not preceded by devaluation of similar 
magnitude, so that 
  
(3) , 2 , 5 , 4 , 3ln( ) ln(( ) / 3) 0.1i t i t i t i tNEER NEER NEER NEER         . 
  
Table 1 lists the resulting appreciation events. In total, we identify 25 large 
appreciation episodes. Moreover, we found this list of large appreciations to be 
surprisingly robust to variations in the event definition – such as expanding or shortening 
the time frame of the appreciation episode from two years to one or three years, relaxing 
or strengthening the criteria for previous devaluations.  
In a next step, we collected detailed historical information on each of these 
appreciation events. This allowed us to classify the events into two different groups. The 
first group consists of appreciation events that occurred without an active policy decision 
to alter the parity on part of the authorities in the concerned country. Typically, such 
cases relate to the appreciation of the anchor currency in a peg against key trading 
partners leading to nominal and real appreciation of a country's currency on a trade-
weighted basis. In other cases, the countries actively adjusted their nominal exchange 
rates, so that the appreciation is potentially endogenous to economic fundamentals as 
discussed below. An example here would be the Bundesbank's consent to a revaluation of 
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the Deutschmark in the late 1960s and early 1970s in response to fears about imported 
inflationary pressures.  
 
Table 1: Appreciation Events 
Country Period  NEER  REER Description 
Australia* 1971 1973 10.20% 10.30% After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the 
depreciation of the US dollar led to the appreciation of the 
Australian dollar which was pegged to the British pound. 
Sweden* 1977 1979 10.80% 11.30% From 1977 to 1991, the Krona was pegged to a trade-
weighted basket of foreign currencies. The appreciation of 
European currencies indirectly triggered the appreciation 
of the Krona on a nominal and real effective basis. 
Ireland* 1978 1980 12.90% 22.00% Ireland joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) in 1979. The appreciation of European currencies 
in the late 1970s triggered appreciation on a trade-
weighted basis. 
Malaysia* 1978 1980 20.30% 16.50% From September 1976 to the end of 1984, the Malaysian 
National Bank stabilized the exchange rate against the 
Singapore dollar. The rise in the Singapore dollar 
triggered the appreciation of the  currency. 
Algeria* 1980 1982 17.20% 28.00% The exchange rate of the Algerian dinar was pegged to a
basket of currencies with a large U.S. dollar weight. 
Dollar strength during the early 1980s led to a strong 
appreciation of the dinar on a trade-weighted basis. 
Singapore* 1980 1982 12.90% 12.40% From 1973 to 1985, Singapore pegged the value of 
Singapore Dollar against a basket of currencies with a 
large US dollar weight. The trade-weighted appreciation 
resulted from dollar strength. 
Belize* 1981 1983 13.70% 16.00% The Belizean currency was pegged to the US dollar. The 
appreciation was triggered by dollar strength at the 
beginning of the 1980s. 
Algeria* 1982 1984 16.60% 11.70% The appreciation of the U.S. dollar during the first half of 
the 1980s led to a strong rise in the real value of the 
Algerian dinar on a trade-weighted basis relative to 
European trading partners. 
Ivory Coast* 1983 1985 16.60% 26.40% The currency appreciated on a trade-weighted basis as a 
consequence of the appreciation of the anchor currency 
(French Franc) against the US Dollar. 
Cameroon* 1984 1986 11.80% 21.20% The currency appreciated on a trade-weighted basis as a 
consequence of the appreciation of the anchor currency 
(French Franc) against the US Dollar. 
Ivory Coast* 1985 1987 30.20% 27.00% The currency appreciated on a trade-weighted basis as a 
consequence of the appreciation of the anchor currency 
(French Franc) against the US Dollar. 
Spain* 1986 1988 10.40% 19.00% The peseta was managed vis-à-vis to other ERM 
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currencies whose appreciation against the dollar, triggered 
appreciation on a trade-weighted basis. 
Singapore* 1988 1990 12.00% 17.00% Trade-weighted appreciation as a function of strength of 
the main anchor currency. 
Spain* 1988 1990 13.40% 11.20% Appreciation was triggered by the appreciation of 
European currencies against the dollar in the late 1980s. 
Germany 1968 1970 10.70% 12.90% Under the Bretton Woods system, the rate of the DM was 
amended in October 1969. The DM was revalued. 
Japan 1970 1972 14.40% 24.00% The exchange rate of the yen was maintained at Yen 360 
per USD from 1949 to 1971. After the United States 
devalued, the Yen was revalued to 308 per USD. 
Switzerland 1971 1973 10.20% 20.60% After the demise of the Bretton Woods system, the Swiss 
franc was revalued twice in 1971.  
Switzerland 1974 1976 22.40% 13.00% The Swiss National Bank de facto managed a sustained 
exchange rate appreciation against dollar and DM,  
Japan 1975 1977 14.70% 20.90% The Bank of Japan managed the appreciation of the yen 
against the dollar.  
Romania 1980 1982 47.50% 35.40% At the beginning of the 1980s, several step appreciations 
of the commercial exchange rate were taken.  
Taiwan 1986 1988 13.90% 11.40% In 1987, the exchange rate regime was changed towards a
more market determined rate, leading to an appreciation 
on a trade-weighted basis. 
Chile 1992 1994 29.80% 15.00% The central bank revalued the “central parity” of the 
currency. It was also decided to widen the bands from 
±5% to ±10%.  
Colombia 1993 1995 11.20% 30.60% The central bank revalued the “central parity” of the 
currency.  
Czech 
Republic 
2001 2003 11.20% 16.40% The appreciation was linked to the introduction of a new
exchange rate regime framework (with a crawling band 
and Central Bank interventions). 
Colombia 2004 2006 10.00% 23.00% The central bank revalued the “central parity” of the 
currency.  
* denotes indirect appreciation events as detailed in the text. All other cases involve active parity 
adjustments by national authorities. Sources: see appendix. 
 
 
A crucial problem for students of the economic effects is that decision to adjust 
the parity and revalue is typically not random. The economic variables whose post-
appreciation behaviour is of interest – such as the current account balance – can be 
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expected to play an important role for the decision to change the exchange rate. Clearly, 
our analysis also needs to address this problem. We propose two ways to deal with the 
issue. First, on the basis of our detailed narrative of the appreciation events we are able to 
identify 14 cases of indirect appreciations, i.e. cases where the nominal and real 
appreciation were "mechanistic" consequences of the appreciation of the anchor currency. 
We argue that such instances of appreciation by the (typically larger) anchor currency are 
by and large exogenous. Put differently, the appreciation of the French franc against the 
dollar in the mid-1980s was not driven by economic developments in Cameroon. But the 
result was an effective appreciation of the trade-weighted exchange rate of Cameroon 
whose macroeconomic effects we can then estimate.  
Second, we run a number of statistical tests to gauge the potential endogeneity 
problems. In table 2 we show the results of panel logit regressions relating the probability 
of appreciation episodes to lagged growth and current accounts. We run separate analysis 
both for the small sample of indirect appreciation episodes (where no active policy 
decision was taken) and the large sample of all appreciations, including active 
revaluations. We test whether strong growth or high current account surpluses increase 
the probability of an appreciation event in a significant way. We also interact the two 
using rolling 3-year moving averages that exclude the initial year when appreciation 
started. While there are reasons to believe that active policy steps to revalue the currency 
become more likely with good economic fundamentals, it is equally conceivable that 
countries with good fundamentals resist exchange rate adjustment for many years and 
that countries with bad fundamentals can also be affected by exogenous appreciation 
shocks linked to movements in their anchor currency.  
The results presented in table 2 gives us an idea about the potential endogeneity 
problems of the two samples. For our small sample of indirect appreciations there is no 
evidence that appreciation is linked to economic fundamentals in the preceding years. All 
individual lags are insignificant. Looking at them jointly, we cannot reject hypothesis that 
all lags are equal to zero. We obtain similar results for the current account. In regression 
(3) we interact growth and current account balance, but we fail to find evidence for 
significant effects. Also for the large sample (which includes episodes with active policy 
adjustments), the lags remain individually and jointly insignificant, but the coefficient 
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estimates increase somewhat. We interpret this as an indication that caution is needed in 
the causal interpretation of our results, in particular in the case of the larger sample. But 
all in all we come away confident that the exogeneity assumptions behind our analysis 
hold up relatively well. In any case, we cannot reject the hypothesis that appreciation and 
revaluation events are unrelated to previous trends in growth and external balances in 
both the restricted and the larger sample.  
 
Table 2: Exogeneity tests
Panel-Logit Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample small small small large large large
Real growth
L.dy 0.948 1.787
(7.197) (5.094)
L2.dy 6.385 5.932
(8.108) (4.501)
L3.dy 5.993 2.795
(7.303) (4.33)
    3-year mov. av. 1.275 3.011
(3.491) (2.461)
Current account/GDP
L.cagdp 0.0401 -0.0106
(0.073) (0.051)
L2.cagdp 0.0298 0.0527
(0.095) (0.057)
L3.cagdp -0.0255 -0.000791
(0.076) (0.037)
  3-year mov. av. -0.0105 -0.00925
(0.0182) (0.0144)
Growth*Current account/GDP 0.0834 0.183
  3-year mov. av. (0.279) (0.197)
Constant 1.266* 1.433* -3.303*** 0.620 0.497 -2.830***
(0.725) (0.767) (0.383) (0.657) (0.745) (0.214)
Test for all lags =0 ,x2 2.028 1.189 4.966 2.217
p-value 0.567 0.756 0.174 0.529
Sum of lag coefficients 13.33 0.0444 10.51 0.0413
se 10.04 0.0533 5.409 0.0316
Time-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,392 3,450 3,628 5,392 3,450 3,628
Number of Countries 127 128 123 127 128 123
Standard errors in parentheses; *** denotes significance at 99% level, ** at 95% level, * at 
90% level.
Dependent variable: revaluation event (0/1)
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3. Econometric Analysis 
 
In the following, we estimate the macroeconomic impact of appreciation episodes. 
We broadly follow the methodology introduced by Cerra and Saxena (2008) and 
extended by Bussière et al. (2010) in their study of the macroeconomic effects of 
devaluations12. Revisiting the literature on the contractionary effects of devaluations is 
beyond of the scope of this paper.13 Yet we think that of the channels and methods 
pioneered in this literature can be studied symmetrically in the appreciation case. 
Bussière et al. (2010) use both static and dynamic panel analysis. In the static model, 
growth is regressed on a number of variables in a first attempt to determine the average 
behaviour of output following a currency crash. The dynamic model builds on univariate 
autoregressive fixed-effects estimation. From this one can derive impulse-responses that 
display an estimate of the total effect of a currency change over time. The dummy 
augmented panel autoregressive model we use takes the following form, 
 
(4)   
1 0
p q
it i t i it j s it s it
j s
x x E     
 
      . 
 
The dependent variable xi,t is the macroeconomic variable of interest. Period and 
time effects capture cross-sectional and time-specific heterogeneity in the evolution of 
xi,t. They are given by i and t, respectively. Inertia, i.e. serial correlation, is modelled 
through the inclusion of lagged variables of xi,t . Large appreciation events enter the 
equation through current and lagged values of the dummy variable Eit. Finally, εit denotes 
unsystematic error in the evolution of the left hand side variable. The model is estimated 
for each of the variables of interest by OLS. White standard errors that are robust to 
observation specific heteroskedasticity in the disturbances are used for inference. The lag 
length of the endogenous variable and the dummy variable is set to four for all model 
                                                 
12 More generally, there is a large literature on the contractionary effects of devaluation, mostly in a 
developing-country context, which we will not recall here (see for instance Krugman and Taylor (1978), 
Shi (2006), etc.). Some of the channels emphasised in that specific literature (beyond those discussed below 
for elasticity’s and real balance effects) have been symmetrically used in this paper for the analysis of 
appreciations. 
13  Important references are Krugman and Taylor (1978) as well as Shi (2006). 
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specifications. First, a common lag length facilitates comparison of impulse response 
functions across different estimation setups by assuring that lagged influences from the 
endogenous variables and the event dummies are captured equally across models. 
Second, four lags of both the endogenous variable and the event dummy turned out to be 
sufficient for capturing the relevant dynamics. Shorter lag lengths typically did not 
capture all relevant dynamics. 
For robustness purposes, we work with the two different appreciation event 
definitions that we discussed above. Our small sample consists of 14 instances of large 
appreciations that occurred without active policy changes on the part of the country. In 
our large sample, we additionally include a roughly equal number of large appreciations 
that reflect active policy decision by the countries' authorities. Our strategy therefore 
builds on two pillars. First, we took great care to study the history of each individual 
appreciation episode. In our sample of indirect appreciation events we included only 
appreciation shocks that were linked to changes in the value of the anchor currency and 
appeared exogenous to economic trends in the country that operated the peg. Second, our 
statistical tests above returned no major hints of serious violations of the exogeneity 
assumption also for the larger sample, although careful interpretation of the results is 
needed.  
However, in light of the importance of the question, we need to be aware of the 
potential biases introduced to our analysis, which will help to guide the interpretation.  A 
simultaneity bias could arise when the contemporaneous exchange rate event Eit is 
determined simultaneously along with the left hand side variable xit. For instance, if 
revaluation becomes more likely with strong growth or with an increasing current 
account surplus, then Eit and the error term of equation (5) are correlated and OLS-based 
estimates of δ0 will be biased. The size and direction of the bias generally depend on the 
covariance between xit and the error term that governs the law of motion of Eit. At least 
for the direction of the bias we can give an intuition for the potential effect.  
Consider the finding that a strong and sustained exchange rate appreciation 
deteriorates the current account (detailed results are presented below). By assuming that 
the exchange rate event is exogenous, we attribute the adjustment of the current account 
to the impact of the event. However, if the occurrence of a period of currency 
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appreciation is a result, rather than a cause, of the deteriorating current account, then the 
impact of the exchange rate event would be due only to the lagged effects of Eit in 
equation (5). In this case, the estimated downward adjustments of the current account as 
shown in the figures below may be too strong. Yet from an economic point of view, it 
seems rather unlikely that appreciation is a function of a deteriorating current account. If 
anything, the opposite would be expected.  
We present our estimation results as responses of the current account and output 
growth to contemporaneous and lagged impulses from of the appreciation event. As 
discussed above, we also model the effect on aggregate saving and investment separately. 
These impulse responses are shown with 68 percent confidence intervals based on 
stochastic simulations of the estimated coefficient uncertainty. For the purpose of 
simplicity, in the figures below we present the mean response together with bands that 
show the mean response ± one standard deviation. We will refer to responses as 
significant in statistical terms if the 68 percent confidence intervals do not encompass the 
zero line. Our main conclusions do not change if we use 90 percent confidence intervals. 
Impulse response functions using 90 percent intervals are reported in the appendix. The 
data appendix also shows the individual panel regression results underlying the impulse 
responses. In the following discussion of the results, we focus on the effect of the 
appreciation shock on the post-event trend of the macroeconomic variables under study, 
but also refer to the resulting level effects for clarification.  
 
    
4. The Macroeconomic Effects of Large Appreciations 
 
We start with the large sample of appreciation events, which we corroborate later 
with the smaller set of indirect appreciation shocks. Figure 1 shows the impulse response 
functions for all 25 appreciation events that we identified across all countries. A number 
of interesting insights emerge from the estimated impulse responses.  
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Figure 1. Impulse responses: all countries, all events 
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First, the immediate output responses seem positive, i.e. output growth 
accelerates, but they turn negative after about three years. After six years, the reduction in 
output growth accumulates to an output loss of about one percent in levels. However, 
wide confidence intervals imply that these losses are insignificant in statistical terms. In 
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light of the time span and possible margins of error, these results provide only weak 
support for the idea that large appreciation shocks lead to pronounced output losses. By 
contrast, the impact of appreciation events on the current account is much stronger. The 
current account balance deteriorates persistently after an appreciation event. The biggest 
effect materialises after three years when the current account balance (as ratio of GDP) is 
almost three percentage points lower than before.  
Does the deterioration of the current account balance reflect a fall in savings or an 
increase in investment? The impulse response of the current account is a reflection of the 
savings and investment responses which are shown in the lower part of figure 1. The 
estimation yields an interesting picture. The sharp decline in the current account balance 
after appreciation is a function of falling saving and increasing investment (at least in the 
first years after the appreciation impulse). It is clear from the data that the impulse 
response of savings dies out only slowly. Even after ten years aggregate saving remains 
significantly below its pre-appreciation level. Investment first jumps after appreciation, 
but turns negative after three years, thus compensating part of the longer-term savings 
effect on the current account. From an econometric perspective, it is worth to mention 
that the estimated responses of the current account, saving and investment are 
considerably more precise than the estimated responses for output. They are also 
statistically significant as the error bands are narrow and do not breach the zero line.  
The reaction of (real) exports and imports diverges strongly post-appreciation. As 
can be seen from the lowest panel in figure 1, imports are by and large unaffected by 
appreciation, but export growth falls sharply in the first three years. The losses 
accumulate to about 15% (relative to trend) in the first three years, but stabilise 
afterwards. Correct interpretation of these level effects is crucial. They do not imply an 
outright decline in the level of real exports, but a significant reduction relative to the pre-
event trend which results in a roughly 15% lower level after three years. Yet the strong 
slowdown in export growth does not leave a strong imprint on overall output. Domestic 
demand becomes the beacon of growth.    
To summarise figure 1, the results provide evidence of a negative and significant 
impact of appreciation events on the current account. This effect is due to the negative 
reaction of domestic savings. Looking at this through the lenses of foreign trade 
  
18
transactions, it becomes clear that export growth decelerates sharply while imports 
remain by and large unaffected. However, these dynamics leave a lesser imprint on 
overall output. The mean output response is negative for horizons above three years but 
insignificant from a statistical point of view. Proponents of appreciation as a remedy for 
global imbalances will take these results as supportive for their position. Large 
appreciation shocks do not meaningfully reduce domestic investment or affect economic 
growth but help rebalance the economy. Domestic absorption rises as a result of lower 
savings. Whether the decline in savings reflects mainly a decline in corporate or 
household savings, will be an interesting topic for further research.  
In Figure 2, we show the estimated impulse responses from our small sample of 
indirect appreciations, i.e. nominal and real effective appreciations that resulted from an 
appreciation of the anchor currency in the peg. Reassuringly, the results are very similar 
so that our key finding seem robust to endogeneity concerns. Appreciation shocks lead to 
a visible deterioration of the current balance, driven by a strong effect on savings. Export 
growth decelerates sharply while imports perform relatively better. With regard to output, 
the estimated effects are similar to those reported above for the broader sample of 
appreciation events. The mean response of output shows a cumulative loss of about two 
percent. While this effect seems permanent, it appears relatively small and statistically 
not different from zero.  
 
` 
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Figure 2. Impulse responses: all countries, indirect events only 
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Table 3 summarizes the key results of our analysis showing the estimated mean 
level effects in the first five years after appreciation and revaluation shocks for all 
countries. Output levels are initially rising, but after five years the cumulated effect is 
marginally negative (output levels are less than 1 percent lower relative to trend). 
However, the current account deteriorates meaningfully (by about 2-3 pp. relative to 
GDP), and export losses accumulate to close to 15% over 5 years. Investment is only 
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marginally affected, while savings fall by about 2.5 pp relative to GDP. If we restrict our 
analysis to the smaller sample of indirect appreciation shocks, the results are very similar, 
albeit the current account deterioration and the slowdown in export growth appear 
somewhat more pronounced.   
 
Table 3: Mean level effects after appreciation (all countries)
Years after appreciation 1 2 3 4 5
Large sample
Output 0.011** 0.014 0.004 -0.005 -0.009
Current account/GDP -1.721** -2.284*** -2.929*** -2.548*** -1.876**
Investment/GDP 0.618 1.373** 0.584 -0.175 -0.792
Savings/GDP -1.050* -1.058 -2.222** -2.159** -2.512**
Real exports -0.044*** -0.122*** -0.160** -0.145 -0.145
Real imports -0.016 -0.033 -0.053 -0.078 -0.077
Small sample
Output 0.019*** 0.022 0.007 -0.009 -0.015
Current account/GDP -1.849 -2.947** -3.102** -2.771** -2.787**
Investment/GDP 0.923 1.948*** 0.91 -0.041 -0.577
Savings/GDP -1.101 -1.307 -2.832** -2.358* -2.912*
Real exports -0.041 -0.162** -0.224* -0.204 -0.242
Real imports -0.005 -0.023 -0.068 -0.119 -0.110
Note: cumulative log-level change for output, exports and imports. Percentage point 
change over GDP for current account, investment and savings,*,**,*** denotes
significance to the 90%, 95%, and 99% level.  
 
5. Effects in Developing and Advanced Economies 
 
In the next step of our empirical analysis, we split our sample in an attempt to 
potentially uncover different dynamics for developing and developed countries.14 As 
discussed above, a growing literature argues that the real exchange rate plays a central 
role for the economic development of poor countries, e.g.. through positive externalities 
from exports of manufactured goods. This sets developing countries apart from advanced 
economies and calls for a disaggregated analysis. As above, we start with the broad event 
definition, but corroborate our results with the purely indirect appreciation episodes. For 
developing countries (figure 3), the estimated event responses of the key variables are 
qualitatively the same as for the entire sample: strong and significant current account 
responses and an indeterminate impact on economic growth. What differs somewhat is 
                                                 
14 We classify all those countries as developing that had a PPP adjusted income of less than one third of the 
US level in the year 1980. 
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the size of the effects. Current account deterioration and the decrease in the saving rate 
are greater than 4 pp. at peak, hence much more pronounced and also more persistent. 
Export losses are almost twice as large in levels while the import response is large but 
with wide confidence intervals. We also find evidence that output losses are somewhat 
higher. They amount to about 2 percent over ten years, but remain statistically 
insignificant. Our estimations also show a more volatile path of the investment rate than 
in the full country sample. 
Figure 3. Impulse responses: developing countries, all events 
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For advanced economies (figure 4), output effects of appreciation shocks are also 
not significantly different from zero and the current account response is considerably 
milder owing to a more short-lived impact on export growth. Large exchange rate 
appreciations have only short (if any) effects on the external balance. Our estimations 
show a significant response only at the three-year horizon. We find an interesting 
difference here as the savings decline is actually more abrupt than in the developing 
country sub-sample. But it goes hand in hand with a decline in investment so that the 
overall savings-investment balance is not strongly affected. However, a smaller number 
of observations in the advanced country sample lowers the precision of the estimated 
coefficients and renders most impulse response functions insignificant.  
All in all, we think that the evidence we find is sufficiently strong to justify the 
idea that the macroeconomic effects of appreciation shocks differ between developed and 
developing countries. The differential effects appear particularly pronounced with regard 
to the external balance that deteriorates more persistently in developing countries. Export 
growth takes a stronger hit in developing countries, but is counterbalanced by stronger 
domestic growth. Also the growth response is different. While not statistically significant, 
the point estimates suggest a stronger impact of appreciation on economic growth in 
developing countries. The growth path of a typical advanced country is hardly affected by 
appreciation. In developing countries, appreciation episodes lead to output losses more 
often.   
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Figure 4. Impulse responses: advanced countries, all events 
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Table 4 summarizes our empirical findings with regard to different event 
responses in developing and advanced economies. Across the variables studied here, the 
macroeconomic effects of appreciation and revaluation shocks appear stronger in less 
developed countries. The current account correction is more pronounced as is the decline 
in savings which is about twice as strong as in advanced economies. The behaviour of 
export and import growth also differs between both groups, with developing countries' 
exports exhibiting a much stronger sensitivity to exchange rate appreciation. However, 
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according to our estimates here the investment dynamic remains by and large unaffected 
and the output effects in developing countries remain small and statistically insignificant. 
Overall, the previous conclusion that the economic effects of appreciation shocks are 
somewhat stronger in developing countries is clearly confirmed. 
 
Table 4: Mean level effects in developing and advanced economies
Years after appreciation 1 2 3 4 5
Advanced economies
Output 0.007 0.014 0.003 -0.004 -0.003
Current account/GDP -1.165 -0.939 -2.309* -0.827 -0.595
Investment/GDP -0.094 0.787 -0.258 -1.712* -1.886**
Savings/GDP -1.171 -1.255 -1.176 -1.228 -1.246
Real exports -0.038*** -0.108*** -0.088 -0.042 0.016
Real imports -0.052** -0.049 -0.031 -0.031 0.009
Developing economies
Output 0.013* 0.012 0.002 -0.006 -0.014
Current account/GDP -2.402** -3.398*** -4.045*** -4.56*** -4.422***
Investment/GDP 0.965* 1.603** 1.272 0.769 -0.205
Savings/GDP -0.999 -1.138 -3.161** -2.893* -3.668**
Real exports -0.049 -0.137* -0.231* -0.247 -0.306
Real imports -0.001 -0.020 -0.047 -0.113 -0.153
Note: cumulative log-level change for output, exports and imports. Percentage point 
change over GDP for current account, investment and savings,*,**,*** denotes 
significance to the 90%, 95%, and 99% level.  
 
In a final step, we will again test the robustness of these results to a change in the 
event definition. By limiting our analysis to events that did not involve discretionary 
action by the authorities, we aim to get an idea about potential biases introduced by 
endogeneity of the appreciation event. In brief, this robustness check does not lead to 
materially different conclusions. In figures 5 and 6, we maintain the split of the sample 
between developing and developed countries, but study the responses of growth and 
external balances using the more parsimonious indirect event definition. The external 
adjustment in response to large exchange rate appreciations appears again stronger in 
developing countries where savings fall but investment remains by and large unaffected. 
In advanced countries, the fall in savings is not only less pronounced, it is also 
compensated by a parallel fall in investment which leaves the external balance 
unaffected. As noted above, a similar difference between developing and advanced 
countries can also be seen in the graph showing the output response. The confidence 
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bands remain wide so that these results have to be taken with caution, but our estimates 
point to limited output losses in developing countries while appreciation has virtually no 
impact on growth in advanced economies. All in all, these results confirm our previous 
findings with regard to the macroeconomic effects of large appreciation shocks.  
 
Figure 5. Impulse responses: developing countries, indirect events only 
Output 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Current account 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
 
Savings 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Investment 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
 
Exports 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
Imports 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
 
 
 
 
  
26
Figure 6. Impulse responses: advanced countries, indirect events only 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The macroeconomic effects of exchange rate changes are likely to remain a 
contentious issue in international economics. While the debate about global rebalancing 
has gained traction after the financial crisis of 2008-09, the wisdom of using exchange 
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rates as an adjustment tool remains debated. This partly reflects long-standing 
disagreement in the profession about the determinants of current account balances. Until 
recently, scepticism with regard to the effects of (even large) exchange rate adjustment on 
global current account balances has been widespread. Other recent contributions by 
Ahmed (2009), and Cline (2010), however, have struck a little more optimistic tune 
towards the effects of exchange rate changes. 
In this paper, we have studied the empirical record of almost 50 years of 
international economic history. Using data for 128 countries between 1960 and 2008, we 
have found 25 episodes of large sustained exchange rate revaluations, which we define as 
both nominal and real effective exchange rate appreciations of 10 percent (and more) 
within a two year window (or less). Studying the institutional context of each individual 
episode in detail, we identified 14 cases of appreciation shocks that occurred not as a 
result of discretionary policy action, but were passively linked to the appreciation of the 
anchor currency in the context of an exchange rate peg. We argue that these cases 
represent instances of exogenous appreciation shocks that we can use to estimate the 
macroeconomic impact of large appreciations and assess the robustness of estimates 
based on a wider definition of appreciation and revaluation events. Using a dummy-
augmented autoregressive panel model we could indeed show that such large 
appreciations episodes have strong macroeconomic effects. Most importantly, we 
established four key stylized facts that can prove useful in the ongoing debate about the 
role of exchange rate adjustment for global rebalancing. 
First, the current account balance typically falls strongly in response to large 
exchange rate revaluations. Three years after the revaluation, the current account balance 
deteriorates by about 3 pp. relative to GDP. This is due to a reduction in aggregate 
savings without a concomitant fall in investment. The effect on the current account 
balance is statistically significant and robust to variation in the country sample and the 
definition of appreciation events.  
Second, the effects on output seem limited. Our point estimates suggest a negative 
effect of output growth, albeit of relatively small magnitude: on average, the aggregate 
level effect on output amounts to about 1 percent after six years. The confidence intervals 
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are also considerably wider than for the current account. The output effects are 
statistically not significant.   
Third, while aggregate output is not strongly affected, export growth falls 
significantly after appreciation shocks. Import growth remains by and large unchanged 
resulting in the observed deterioration in external balances. As aggregate economic 
growth is much less affected, our results point to a positive domestic demand response 
following appreciation episodes. 
Fourth, these effects seem to be more pronounced in developing countries. The 
sensitivity of the current account balance to revaluation shocks is higher. The effect 
reaches almost 4 percentage points of GDP after three years and is statistically 
significant. But also the potentially negative effects on output are larger. Our point 
estimates point to a loss in output of 2 percent over ten years. But confidence intervals 
remain wide, so that these results miss statistically significant levels. Why these effects 
are stronger in developing countries will be an important question that we aim to address 
in future research. 
In sum, the historical record of large exchange rate revaluations that we have 
studied in this paper lends some support to the idea that large exchange rate appreciations 
and revaluations have an impact on the current account as they lead to marked changes of 
savings and investment within countries. Appreciation shocks impact external balances, 
but this effect potentially comes at the cost of a reduction of dynamism in exports. While 
the domestic economy seems to pick up some of the external slack, leaving overall 
growth relatively unaffected, the prospect of sharp decelerations in export growth will 
remain a concern for policy-makers and bears watching especially in the context of 
developing countries.  
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Appendix A: Impulse Responses with 90% Confidence Intervals 
 
 
Figure 1a. Impulse responses: all countries, all events 
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Figure 2a. Impulse responses: all countries, indirect events only 
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Figure 3a. Impulse responses: developing countries, all events 
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Figure 4a. Impulse responses: advanced countries, all events 
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Figure 5a. Impulse responses: developing countries, indirect events only 
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Figure 6a. Impulse responses: advanced countries, indirect events only 
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Appendix B: Regression Results 
 
Table 1b. All countries, all events 
CAGDP Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -1.018  0.245 -4.163  0.00 
CAGDP(-1)  0.396  0.152  2.609  0.01 
CAGDP(-2)  0.037  0.072  0.512  0.61 
CAGDP(-3)  0.077  0.047  1.634  0.10 
CAGDP(-4)  0.048  0.039  1.223  0.22 
REVAL -1.740  0.755 -2.305  0.02 
REVAL (-1) -1.567  0.778 -2.015  0.04 
REVAL (-2) -1.945  0.760 -2.558  0.01 
REVAL (-3) -1.202  0.696 -1.728  0.08 
REVAL (-4) -0.546  0.683 -0.800  0.42 
DY Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  0.013  0.001  11.973  0.00 
DY(-1)  0.204  0.042  4.871  0.00 
DY(-2)  0.062  0.022  2.856  0.00 
DY(-3)  0.030  0.024  1.247  0.21 
DY(-4) -0.049  0.023 -2.131  0.03 
REVHAL  0.011  0.004  2.614  0.01 
REVAL (-1)  0.001  0.005  0.092  0.93 
REVAL (-2) -0.012  0.006 -1.983  0.05 
REVAL (-3) -0.007  0.008 -0.931  0.35 
REVAL (-4) -0.002  0.005 -0.332  0.74 
INVGDP Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  5.719  0.548  10.428  0.00 
INVGDP(-1)  0.734  0.052  14.020  0.00 
INVGDP(-2) -0.022  0.065 -0.340  0.73 
INVGDP(-3)  0.029  0.062  0.473  0.64 
INVGDP(-4)  0.003  0.034  0.075  0.94 
REVAL  0.629  0.438  1.436  0.15 
REVAL(-1)  0.922  0.374  2.463  0.01 
REVAL(-2) -0.435  0.549 -0.794  0.43 
REVAL(-3) -0.569  0.578 -0.986  0.32 
REVAL(-4) -0.704  0.525 -1.342  0.18 
SAVGDP Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  3.255  0.575  5.660  0.00 
SAVGDP(-1)  0.737  0.067  11.002  0.00 
SAVGDP(-2)  0.043  0.056  0.770  0.44 
SAVGDP(-3)  0.017  0.052  0.327  0.74 
SAVGDP(-4)  0.029  0.036  0.807  0.42 
REVAL -1.043  0.543 -1.919  0.06 
REVAL (-1) -0.277  0.672 -0.413  0.68 
REVAL (-2) -1.404  0.674 -2.083  0.04 
REVAL (-3) -0.451  0.600 -0.751  0.45 
REVAL (-4) -0.791  0.615 -1.286  0.20 
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Table 2b. All countries, indirect events only 
CAGDP Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -1.034  0.246 -4.195  0.00 
CAGDP(-1)  0.397  0.152  2.610  0.01 
CAGDP(-2)  0.037  0.072  0.511  0.61 
CAGDP(-3)  0.077  0.047  1.633  0.10 
CAGDP(-4)  0.048  0.039  1.216  0.22 
REVAL1 -1.802  1.288 -1.399  0.16 
REVAL1(-1) -2.266  1.215 -1.865  0.06 
REVAL1 (-2) -1.806  1.194 -1.513  0.13 
REVAL1 (-3) -1.291  1.024 -1.261  0.21 
REVAL1 (-4) -1.281  0.988 -1.297  0.19 
EQ_DY Dep. Var: DY   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  0.013  0.001  11.974  0.00 
DY(-1)  0.204  0.042  4.869  0.00 
DY(-2)  0.062  0.022  2.862  0.00 
DY(-3)  0.030  0.024  1.249  0.21 
DY(-4) -0.049  0.023 -2.134  0.03 
REVAL1  0.020  0.006  3.499  0.00 
REVAL1 (-1) -0.002  0.009 -0.201  0.84 
REVAL1 (-2) -0.016  0.007 -2.270  0.02 
REVAL1 (-3) -0.014  0.012 -1.161  0.25 
REVAL1 (-4) -0.001  0.006 -0.174  0.86 
EQ_INVGDP Dep. Var: INVGDP   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  5.717  0.548  10.432  0.00 
INVGDP(-1)  0.734  0.052  14.019  0.00 
INVGDP(-2) -0.022  0.065 -0.338  0.74 
INVGDP(-3)  0.029  0.062  0.473  0.64 
INVGDP(-4)  0.002  0.034  0.070  0.94 
REVAL1  0.896  0.596  1.504  0.13 
REVAL1 (-1)  1.277  0.478  2.674  0.01 
REVAL1 (-2) -0.503  0.705 -0.713  0.48 
REVAL1 (-3) -0.742  0.820 -0.904  0.37 
REVAL1 (-4) -0.571  0.617 -0.926  0.35 
EQ_SAVGDP Dep. Var: SAVGDP   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  3.252  0.575  5.656  0.00 
SAVGDP(-1)  0.737  0.067  11.006  0.00 
SAVGDP(-2)  0.043  0.056  0.769  0.44 
SAVGDP(-3)  0.017  0.052  0.328  0.74 
SAVGDP(-4)  0.029  0.036  0.801  0.42 
REVAL1 -1.075  0.816 -1.316  0.19 
REVAL1 (-1) -0.484  1.035 -0.468  0.64 
REVAL1 (-2) -1.807  1.005 -1.798  0.07 
REVAL1 (-3) -0.224  0.884 -0.254  0.80 
REVAL1 (-4) -1.018  0.859 -1.185  0.24 
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Table 3b. Developing countries, all events 
CAGDP Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.983  0.319 -3.079  0.00 
CAGDP(-1)  0.634  0.060  10.555  0.00 
CAGDP(-2) -0.041  0.059 -0.687  0.49 
CAGDP(-3)  0.063  0.054  1.166  0.24 
CAGDP(-4)  0.060  0.054  1.108  0.27 
REVAL -2.426  1.002 -2.420  0.02 
REVAL(-1) -1.907  0.800 -2.385  0.02 
REVAL(-2) -2.000  0.913 -2.191  0.03 
REVAL(-3) -1.998  0.724 -2.760  0.01 
REVAL(-4) -1.305  1.104 -1.182  0.24 
EQ_DY Dep. Var: DY   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  0.013  0.001  10.269  0.00 
DY(-1)  0.173  0.044  3.959  0.00 
DY(-2)  0.080  0.022  3.672  0.00 
DY(-3)  0.045  0.026  1.754  0.08 
DY(-4) -0.047  0.025 -1.835  0.07 
REVAL  0.013  0.006  2.021  0.04 
REVAL(-1) -0.003  0.009 -0.307  0.76 
REVAL(-2) -0.011  0.008 -1.471  0.14 
REVAL(-3) -0.007  0.012 -0.597  0.55 
REVAL(-4) -0.005  0.008 -0.600  0.55 
EQ_INVGDP Dep. Var: INVGDP   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  5.635  0.499  11.289  0.00 
INVGDP(-1)  0.753  0.061  12.356  0.00 
INVGDP(-2) -0.082  0.078 -1.053  0.29 
INVGDP(-3)  0.081  0.071  1.136  0.26 
INVGDP(-4) -0.009  0.037 -0.252  0.80 
REVAL  0.969  0.517  1.875  0.06 
REVAL(-1)  0.859  0.523  1.642  0.10 
REVAL(-2)  0.117  0.705  0.167  0.87 
REVAL(-3) -0.137  0.898 -0.153  0.88 
REVAL(-4) -0.830  0.857 -0.968  0.33 
EQ_SAVGDP Dep. Var: SAVGDP   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  2.765  0.565  4.891  0.00 
SAVGDP(-1)  0.742  0.070  10.647  0.00 
SAVGDP(-2)  0.039  0.064  0.614  0.54 
SAVGDP(-3)  0.012  0.061  0.193  0.85 
SAVGDP(-4)  0.038  0.043  0.896  0.37 
REVAL -0.996  0.753 -1.321  0.19 
REVAL(-1) -0.322  1.116 -0.289  0.77 
REVAL(-2) -2.294  1.022 -2.245  0.02 
REVAL(-3) -0.486  0.983 -0.495  0.62 
REVAL(-4) -1.325  1.046 -1.266  0.21 
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Table 4b. Advanced countries, all events 
CAGDP Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  0.378  0.315  1.201  0.23 
CAGDP(-1)  0.247  0.127  1.942  0.05 
CAGDP(-2)  0.027  0.068  0.402  0.69 
CAGDP(-3)  0.074  0.054  1.364  0.17 
CAGDP(-4)  0.051  0.051  1.007  0.31 
REVAL -1.200  1.010 -1.189  0.23 
REVAL(-1) -0.691  1.731 -0.399  0.69 
REVAL(-2) -2.041  1.044 -1.955  0.05 
REVAL(-3) -0.186  1.524 -0.122  0.90 
REVAL(-4) -0.224  0.802 -0.280  0.78 
EQ_DY Dep. Var: DY   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  0.016  0.002  6.825  0.00 
DY(-1)  0.339  0.099  3.441  0.00 
DY(-2) -0.046  0.070 -0.660  0.51 
DY(-3) -0.040  0.066 -0.605  0.55 
DY(-4) -0.064  0.053 -1.201  0.23 
REVAL  0.007  0.005  1.385  0.17 
REVAL(-1)  0.004  0.005  0.842  0.40 
REVAL(-2) -0.013  0.008 -1.499  0.13 
REVAL(-3) -0.003  0.007 -0.460  0.65 
REVAL(-4)  0.003  0.006  0.527  0.60 
EQ_INVGDP Dep. Var: INVGDP   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  8.717  2.278  3.826  0.00 
INVGDP(-1)  0.640  0.108  5.934  0.00 
INVGDP(-2)  0.132  0.093  1.423  0.15 
INVGDP(-3) -0.116  0.087 -1.332  0.18 
INVGDP(-4) -0.026  0.076 -0.348  0.73 
REVAL -0.111  0.934 -0.119  0.91 
REVAL(-1)  0.845  0.787  1.075  0.28 
REVAL(-2) -0.755  0.761 -0.992  0.32 
REVAL(-3) -1.636  0.643 -2.542  0.01 
REVAL(-4) -0.672  0.749 -0.897  0.37 
EQ_SAVGDP Dep. Var: SAVGDP   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  5.080  1.797  2.826  0.00 
SAVGDP(-1)  0.712  0.184  3.871  0.00 
SAVGDP(-2)  0.065  0.120  0.544  0.59 
SAVGDP(-3)  0.032  0.088  0.367  0.71 
SAVGDP(-4) -0.010  0.061 -0.160  0.87 
REVAL -1.159  0.952 -1.218  0.22 
REVAL(-1) -0.476  0.904 -0.526  0.60 
REVAL(-2) -0.216  0.771 -0.280  0.78 
REVAL(-3) -0.323  0.696 -0.464  0.64 
REVAL(-4) -0.285  0.747 -0.382  0.70 
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Table 5b. Developing countries, indirect events only 
CAGDP Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.998  0.319 -3.126  0.00 
CAGDP(-1)  0.634  0.060  10.555  0.00 
CAGDP(-2) -0.041  0.059 -0.693  0.49 
CAGDP(-3)  0.064  0.054  1.170  0.24 
CAGDP(-4)  0.059  0.054  1.094  0.27 
REVAL1 -2.314  1.525 -1.518  0.13 
REVAL1(-1) -2.538  1.193 -2.129  0.03 
REVAL1(-2) -2.900  1.368 -2.119  0.03 
REVAL1(-3) -2.558  1.014 -2.523  0.01 
REVAL1(-4) -1.973  1.556 -1.268  0.21 
EQ_DY Dep. Var: DY   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  0.013  0.001  10.258  0.00 
DY(-1)  0.173  0.044  3.957  0.00 
DY(-2)  0.080  0.022  3.683  0.00 
DY(-3)  0.046  0.026  1.757  0.08 
DY(-4) -0.047  0.025 -1.844  0.07 
REVAL1  0.026  0.007  3.674  0.00 
REVAL1(-1) -0.004  0.014 -0.247  0.81 
REVAL1(-2) -0.027  0.010 -2.683  0.01 
REVAL1(-3) -0.016  0.019 -0.852  0.39 
REVAL1(-4)  0.002  0.009  0.186  0.85 
EQ_INVGDP Dep. Var: INVGDP   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  5.637  0.499  11.292  0.00 
INVGDP(-1)  0.753  0.061  12.355  0.00 
INVGDP(-2) -0.082  0.078 -1.050  0.29 
INVGDP(-3)  0.081  0.071  1.136  0.26 
INVGDP(-4) -0.010  0.037 -0.262  0.79 
REVAL1  1.338  0.671  1.993  0.05 
REVAL1(-1)  1.284  0.715  1.796  0.07 
REVAL1(-2)  0.021  1.040  0.021  0.98 
REVAL1(-3) -0.538  1.287 -0.418  0.68 
REVAL1(-4) -0.705  1.005 -0.702  0.48 
EQ_SAVGDP Dep. Var: SAVGDP   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  2.762  0.565  4.891  0.00 
SAVGDP(-1)  0.742  0.070  10.647  0.00 
SAVGDP(-2)  0.039  0.064  0.613  0.54 
SAVGDP(-3)  0.012  0.061  0.195  0.85 
SAVGDP(-4)  0.038  0.043  0.898  0.37 
REVAL1 -0.975  1.040 -0.938  0.35 
REVAL1(-1) -0.750  1.595 -0.470  0.64 
REVAL1(-2) -3.174  1.372 -2.313  0.02 
REVAL1(-3) -0.419  1.313 -0.319  0.75 
REVAL1(-4) -1.622  1.259 -1.289  0.20 
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Table 6b. Advanced countries, indirect events only 
CAGDP Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  0.332  0.315  1.055  0.29 
CAGDP(-1)  0.247  0.127  1.941  0.05 
CAGDP(-2)  0.028  0.068  0.409  0.68 
CAGDP(-3)  0.075  0.055  1.362  0.17 
CAGDP(-4)  0.051  0.051  1.009  0.31 
REVAL1 -1.092  1.681 -0.650  0.52 
REVAL1(-1) -1.470  2.703 -0.544  0.59 
REVAL1(-2) -0.569  1.190 -0.479  0.63 
REVAL1(-3)  2.833  2.359  1.201  0.23 
REVAL1(-4)  0.423  0.673  0.628  0.53 
EQ_DY Dep. Var: DY   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  0.016  0.002  6.866  0.00 
DY(-1)  0.339  0.098  3.445  0.00 
DY(-2) -0.047  0.070 -0.670  0.50 
DY(-3) -0.039  0.066 -0.586  0.56 
DY(-4) -0.065  0.053 -1.211  0.23 
REVAL1  0.008  0.005  1.618  0.11 
REVAL1(-1)  0.001  0.007  0.104  0.92 
REVAL1(-2)  0.003  0.007  0.477  0.63 
REVAL1(-3) -0.011  0.010 -1.051  0.29 
REVAL1(-4) -0.006  0.006 -0.909  0.36 
EQ_INVGDP Dep. Var: INVGDP   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  8.687  2.279  3.813  0.00 
INVGDP(-1)  0.640  0.108  5.939  0.00 
INVGDP(-2)  0.132  0.093  1.418  0.16 
INVGDP(-3) -0.116  0.087 -1.326  0.18 
INVGDP(-4) -0.026  0.076 -0.347  0.73 
REVAL1 -0.067  1.039 -0.064  0.95 
REVAL1(-1)  0.986  0.702  1.405  0.16 
REVAL1(-2) -0.506  0.618 -0.818  0.41 
REVAL1(-3) -1.970  0.460 -4.285  0.00 
REVAL1(-4) -0.358  0.572 -0.626  0.53 
EQ_SAVGDP Dep. Var: SAVGDP   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  5.056  1.797  2.814  0.00 
SAVGDP(-1)  0.712  0.184  3.870  0.00 
SAVGDP(-2)  0.066  0.120  0.546  0.59 
SAVGDP(-3)  0.033  0.088  0.370  0.71 
SAVGDP(-4) -0.010  0.061 -0.165  0.87 
REVAL1 -1.513  1.314 -1.151  0.25 
REVAL1(-1) -0.736  1.112 -0.661  0.51 
REVAL1(-2)  0.430  1.123  0.383  0.70 
REVAL1(-3)  0.571  1.016  0.562  0.57 
REVAL1(-4) -0.163  0.988 -0.165  0.87 
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Appendix C: Data Sources 
 
1. Real GDP per capita in constant prices 
Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, OECD, Paris 2003. The 
data can be found online at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/ 
 
2. Current account balance (% of GDP) 
Data are from the World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006, Washington DC. 
Taiwanese data were obtained from the Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific 
Countries, published by the Asian Development Bank. 
 
3. Gross national savings (% of GDP) 
Calculated as current price gross national savings as a proportion of current price GDP. 
Data are from International Monetary Fund (2009), World Economic Outlook Database, 
Washington DC. For Taiwan, see above 
 
4. Investment (% of GDP) 
Calculated as current price investment as a proportion of current price GDP. 
Data are from the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database 
(2009), Washington DC. Data are based on individual countries' national accounts 
statistics. For Taiwan, see above 
 
5. Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) 
Data are from the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (2009), 
Washington DC. We also used Bank for International Settlements estimates to extend the 
sample from 1963, when data are available. 
 
6. Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) 
Real effective exchange rate are based on relative consumer prices. 
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Data are from the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (2009), 
Washington DC. We also used Bank for International Settlements estimates to extend the 
sample from 1963, when data are available. 
  
7. Exchange rate regime 
We used the Reinhart-Rogoff (RR) classification of exchange rate regimes, updated by 
Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). We used the fine RR classification, ranging de facto 
exchange rate regimes from 1 to 15.  For an index from 1 to 8, we classified the exchange 
rate regime as pegged, and from 9 to 15, we classified it as floating. For each case, we 
then described in greater details the appreciations, to identify episodes corresponding to 
our definition. We also included a small number of episodes in the broad sample when 
countries' managed their exchange rates tightly in a narrow band corresponding to 
classification 9-11 on the RR scale.  
 
The classification codes are the following: 
1 No separate legal tender 
2 Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement 
3 Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
4 De facto peg 
5 Pre announced crawling peg 
6 Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
7 De factor crawling peg 
8 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
9 Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2% 
10 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5% 
11 Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
12 Managed floating 
13 Freely floating 
14 Freely falling 
15 Dual market in which parallel market data is missing. 
 
Source: Ilzetzki, Ethan O., Reinhart, Carmen, and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2008) “Exchange Rate 
Arrangements Entering the 21st Century: Which Anchor Will Hold?” available at: 
http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~creinhar/Papers.html 
 
8. Real exports and imports 
Data are from the World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006, Washington DC. 
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Taiwanese data were obtained from the Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific 
Countries, published by the Asian Development Bank. 
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